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Tax Competition and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Japanese Perspective
Keigo Fuchi*
INTRODUCTION
Given the vital role the dormant Commerce Clause plays in
delineating tax jurisdictions of the states and local governments, it
would be difficult to imagine what would happen without this
legal doctrine. This Article will show that the absence of a
dormant Commerce Clause equivalent in Japan has given rise to
serious tax competition. By illustrating the significance of this
legal doctrine and the holding in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,1
this Article demonstrates that Japan could use a similar legal
framework of fiscal federalism from a comparative perspective.
Part I traces the historical development of the dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence with respect to the collection
duty for consumption taxes. Particularly, it articulates the rise
and fall of four theories on the constitutionality of the collection
duty proposed by the Supreme Court Justices in the 1940s. Part I
concludes by pointing out that Wayfair removes obstacles to
achieving ideal state consumption taxes.
Part II starts by briefly describing the Japanese tax system.2
Japan is not a federal state, and certain statutes regulating local
governments (both prefectures and municipalities) secure each
governments’ autonomy. These statutes grant local governments a
qualified power to impose their own “extra-statutory taxes”—taxes
that are exclusively based on ordinances [jorei] of a local government.
The tax revenue system for local governments in Japan is unique.
Property tax and local personal income tax are kept by municipalities
as their principal sources of revenue. Local corporate income tax is
the most important source of revenue for prefectures. Such division
and allocation of the sources of revenue gives rise to a considerable
disparity of tax revenue among local governments. This Part
illustrates how this disparity gives rise to tax competition among
local governments in Japan, highlighting the absence of a Japanese
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Professor of Law, Kobe University Graduate School of Law.
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089–96 (2018).
See infra Part II.
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dormant Commerce Clause equivalent. The Japanese courts have
failed to put forward a meaningful standard to judge whether local
tax legislation interferes with, and places an undue burden on, free
movement of goods and services within the country. The content of
the provisions of the Local Tax Act—the statute governing whether
local tax legislation interferes with, and thereby places an undue
burden on, the movement of goods and services within Japan—is, to
say the least, vague. Moreover, it is not obvious whether clear
principles for allocating taxing powers among local governments are
truly recognized in Japan. Part II then discusses two examples that
highlight the absence of a dormant Commerce Clause equivalent in
Japan. First, this Part examines taxation by some local governments
that induces the exports of nuclear waste. It is apparent that the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce, but there are no means to
invalidate the tax. The second is the recent “hometown tax donation”
system that makes it possible for a taxpayer to pay a part of his tax
to other local governments. Although this system is becoming
popular and being praised as an excellent tool for revitalizing local
economy in Japan, it conflicts with most of the principles pronounced
by the United States Supreme Court. This Article concludes by
emphasizing the significance of the dormant Commerce Clause and
Wayfair and how Japan can learn from United States jurisprudence
and its local taxation system.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE CASES ON THE COLLECTION DUTY FOR STATE
CONSUMPTION TAXES
A. Introduction
In this Part, this Article discusses the role of the dormant
Commerce Clause in limiting the tax sovereignty of the states.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the cases, two preliminary
comments are worth noting.
First, apart from concrete provisions of the constitution and
statutes of each country, the extent of taxing power can be divided
into two questions. The first question is whether imposing a given
tax to a given person, property, or transaction is within the scope
of the tax jurisdiction of the state or local government. When the
taxation is deemed to be an extraterritorial exercise of its tax
jurisdiction, it is per se unconstitutional or illegal. The second
question asks, given that the tax itself is within the government’s
jurisdiction, whether the imposition of the tax affects the economic
activity and/or the decision-making of people so much that it
conflicts with the exercise of the police power of other states or
local governments. The exercise of the taxing power by one state
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may significantly harm another state’s exercise of regulatory
power. In this case, the exercise of taxing power will be
invalidated. In the United States, throughout the development of
case law on state taxation, these two questions are treated
concurrently and sometimes inseparably. Both the Due Process
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause are employed for
answering the questions.
Second, the nature of the tax or the duty in question is
important in determining their validity. Since its birth as a
judicial doctrine, the dormant Commerce Clause has often
applied to state and local tax cases. One of the most difficult
issues has been determining the conditions under which a state
can mandate nonresidents or out of state businesses to be subject
to state use tax.3 Here, the consumers of goods and services, to
whom the economic burden of the tax shifts, are supposed to be
residents of the state. This is a difficult issue because the nature
of use tax is equivocal.
To begin with, the state may impose sales tax on businesses
as an indirect tax. 4 The taxpayers of the sales tax are the
businesses, whereas the economic burden of the tax shifts to the
consumers of the goods and services sold. The businesses are
located in the state or at least have sufficient factual connection
with the jurisdiction. Therefore, nothing prevents the state from
imposing sales tax liability on them.
Use tax is, from its inception, a supplementary tax contrived to
avoid any possible doubts as to the taxing power against out-of-state
businesses. The taxpayers of the use tax are consumers—residents
of the state. They also bear the burden of the tax. There is no
problem for the state to impose the tax on its residents. However,
the key issue is whether it is possible to designate businesses as the
agent for collection and payment of the tax. In use tax, the
consumers have only secondary liability, even though they are the
original taxpayers. Otherwise they would be exempt from the duty.
If we take this legal construction at face value, there appears to be
no extraterritorial exercise of taxing power. The consumers, the
original taxpayers, are within the boundary of the state. It is their
agent who was on the outside of the territory by chance. Moreover,
it might be argued that the liability of the agent is not tax liability,
but a duty to act or cooperate with the state in a certain way.

See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
See generally John L. Mikesell, Remote Vendors and American Sales and Use
Taxation: The Balance between Fixing the Problem and Fixing the Tax, 53 NAT’L TAX J.
1273 (2000) (indicating that retail sales taxes are defensible as the American approach to
indirect consumption taxation).
3
4
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If this is the case, the constitutionality of the duty would be
better decided according to non-tax precedent.
However, if we take seriously the fact that use tax is in effect
a version of sales tax, we should apply the same legal standards
used to analyze sales tax. It follows that the businesses located
out-of-state must be regarded not as just a collecting agent, but
as the taxpayer of use tax. Thus, it would be almost impossible to
justify use tax without also justifying sales tax against
out-of-state retailers at the same time.
B. Early Cases
The earliest case on collection duty and the dormant
Commerce Clause was an excise tax case.5 In Monamotor Oil Co.
v. Johnson, Iowa imposed a license fee on all motor vehicle fuel
used in the state. 6 The Iowa statute required distributors to
charge users a price that includes the license fee and to remit
license fee proceeds to the state treasurer.7 The Plaintiff claimed
that the statute imposed a burden upon interstate commerce.8
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Roberts,
rejected that claim holding that the levy “falls on the local use
after interstate commerce has ended” 9 and the distributor’s
burden is “too slight.”10
A few years later, the first case on use tax reached the
Supreme Court. 11 In Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher,
California required retailers that maintained a place of business
in the state to collect use tax from purchasers. 12 The Plaintiff,
who manufactured and sold “comptometers” in the state through
two general agents, claimed that the collection of use tax
conflicted with the dormant Commerce Clause and the Due
Process Clause.13 Justice McReynolds’s opinion for the Supreme
Court summarily rejected the Plaintiff’s claim without presenting
much, if any, reasoning for the Court’s decision.14
A Supreme Court decision in 1940, regarding sales tax by
New York City (not use tax), articulated the Court’s attitude
toward the collection duty of retailers. 15 In a footnote in
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

See Monamotor Oil v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93 (1934).
Id.
Id. at 88–89.
See id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 94.
See Felt & Tarrant Mfg. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 64 (1939).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 64, 66.
See id. at 65–66.
See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining, 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., Justice Stone made
clear the duty “does not violate the [C]ommerce [C]lause.”16 At that
time, the question of whether out-of-state businesses’ duty to collect
tax was constitutional was not treated separately from the
constitutionality of the tax itself. Even though the Court held the
duty to collect tax to be lawful in these three cases, it did not offer
any material reason for its decisions.
In 1944, two decisions of the Supreme Court were handed
down on the same day directly dealing with the collection duty of
use tax as well as the related question of territorial limits of
taxing power for sales tax.17 In McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., the
issue was whether the levy of sales tax by Arkansas on a
Tennessee corporation with no place of business in Arkansas
was constitutional.18 The Court held, in the opinion by Justice
Frankfurter, that taxing sales consummated out-of-state “would be
to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate
transaction.”19 The Court also emphasized the difference between a
sales tax and a use tax. Whereas the former is “a tax on the freedom
of purchase,” the latter is “a tax on the enjoyment of that which was
purchased.” 20 In General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of
Iowa, the issue was whether it was constitutional for Iowa to
impose a duty to collect use tax from a Minnesota corporation.21
Based on the lower court’s finding that the corporation was a
“retailer maintaining a place of business in [the] state,” the
Supreme Court, in an opinion also delivered by Justice
Frankfurter, upheld the Iowa legislation and affirmed the
collection duty. 22 In sum, Justice Frankfurter’s opinions
distinguished use tax from sales tax and applied a different
standard in judging the constitutionality of each. 23 It is worth
noting that Justice Frankfurter’s opinions did not refer to the
Due Process Clause in either of the cases.24
The opinions delivered by Justice Frankfurter garnered
concurrences and dissents by other Justices. These concurrences
and dissents opened the door to the development of the constitutional
doctrines on the collection duty.

Id. at 50 n.9.
See generally McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Gen. Trading Co.
v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
18 Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328.
19 Id. at 330.
20 Id.
21 Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336.
22 Id. at 337–39.
23 See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338.
24 See generally Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. 335.
16
17
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In his dissenting opinion in Dilworth, Justice Douglas
criticized the majority opinion for being inconsistent with the
Court’s precedents.25 His claim stemmed from the observation that
the economic impact of sales tax and use tax are the same. 26
According to Justice Douglas, both sales and use taxes are indirect
consumption taxes on the consumer. 27 In his dissent, Justice
Douglas opined, “[i]n terms of state power, receipt of goods within
the State of the buyer is as adequate a basis for the exercise of the
taxing power as use within the State.”28 It follows that as long as
imposing use tax does not conflict with the dormant Commerce
Clause, levying sales tax does not either. 29 Although Justice
Douglas said nothing about the collection duty in his dissent, from
his view that sales tax and use tax are one and the same, we can
infer that he wanted to see as little difference as possible in the
collection process of the two taxes.
Justice Jackson also found an affinity between the two taxes.
However, unlike Justice Douglas, Justice Jackson asserted that
not only the sales tax in Dilworth, but also the use tax in General
Trading Co., should be invalidated.30 In his dissent in General
Trading Co., Justice Jackson formulated the issue to be whether
a person is within the jurisdiction of a state.31 He first assumed
that the power to make a person a tax collector is the same as the
power to tax.32 It follows that a nonresident who should not be a
taxpayer for the purpose of sales tax must not be a tax collector
of use tax either. 33 Justice Jackson built his argument on the
concept of jurisdiction but did not articulate the legal basis from
which the concept was derived.
Justice Rutledge, who would have upheld both the sales tax in
Dilworth and the use tax in General Trading Co., distinguished
the Due Process Clause from the dormant Commerce Clause. 34
He considered the Due Process Clause as placing jurisdictional
limitations on tax in general and thus, saw little significance in
the name of sales tax or use tax. 35 Rather, Justice Rutledge
See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 332–34 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (indicating that “realistically the sales tax is a
tax on the receipt of that which was purchased” and is therefore equivalent to the use tax).
27 Id. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29 See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30 See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 339 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
32 See id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 339–40 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
34 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting
in Dilworth and concurring in Gen. Trading Co.).
35 Id. at 350–51.
25
26
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reasoned that both are “in fact and effect a tax levied on an
interstate transaction.”36 From the Due Process Clause perspective,
both the “state of origin and [state] of market” have taxing
power.37 However, the dormant Commerce Clause requires more
substantive consideration for the effect of the taxation. 38 The
standard to be applied here is an analysis of the total burden of a
given type of tax (i.e., the burden when all the states levy various
types of taxes, and place cumulative, discriminatory, or special
burdens on interstate commerce).39 Justice Rutledge’s dissent in
Dilworth, however, has another assumption as its rationale: All
the state sales/use tax should be construed as a destination-based
consumption tax.40 Justice Rutledge defended the Arkansas tax in
Dilworth as such a tax.41 Justice Rutledge, like Justice Douglas,
did not give the collection duty special consideration independent
from substantive tax liability.
C.

Miller Bros., Scripto, and Bellas Hess
In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, Justice Jackson’s opinion for
the Court clarified several issues in construing the collection
duty of an out-of-state retailer.42 First, the question to be asked is
whether imposing a duty to collect is within the reach of a state’s
taxing power. 43 Second, the analysis of this legal concept has
developed, not only from precedent regarding the Due Process
Clause,44 but also from the dormant Commerce Clause.45 Third,
there must be a link to justify the exercise of a state’s taxing
power such as “domicile or residence,” “the situs of property,”
“the keeping of tangible or intangible personalty,” “[c]ertain
activities or transactions carried on within a state, such as the
use and sale of property,” or “incorporation by a state or
permission to do business there . . . .”46
In Miller Bros., Maryland imposed a duty to collect use tax on a
Delaware vendor on all goods it sold to Maryland residents and
seized the vendor’s truck for failing to collect the tax.47 The Court
found that the original tax liability of Maryland residents did not
provide grounds to impose a collection duty on an out-of-state
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361.
See id.
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–46 (1954).
Id. at 342.
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 341.
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vendor.48 The Court also distinguished the Miller Bros. case from
General Trading Co.49 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas
asserted that the majority’s opinion would distort economic
activity given that the state imposed only a minimal burden on
the collector while there was sufficient contact between the
vendor and the state.50
In Scripto Inc. v. Carson, Justice Clark’s opinion for the
Court identified the nexus between the state and the object of
taxation by following the definite link or minimum connection
standard of Miller Bros.51 However, Justice Clark declared that
the case was controlled by the holding in General Trading Co.52
It was National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois that formulated
the physical presence rule, a standard mainly dependent on a
vendor or seller’s physical presence in a state.53 The opinion of
the Court, written by Justice Stewart, inferred from the
preceding cases “[a] sharp distinction . . . between mail order
sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State,
and those who do no more than communicate with customers in
the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general
interstate business.”54 In Bellas Hess, “[a]ll of the contacts which
[Bellas Hess] . . . [had] with the State [were] via the United
States mail or common carrier.” 55 The Court sided with the
putative obligor’s constitutional objections to the collection and
revoked the payment duty of use tax required by the Illinois
statutes. Justice Fortas’s dissenting opinion applied a less
formalistic standard from the same cases and found in the facts
of Bellas Hess “a sufficient nexus” to impose collection duty.56
D. Complete Auto and Quill
Until the advent of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,57 the cases
on the collection duty of use tax were principally independent
from those on state tax liability in general, although Justice
Jackson suggested in General Trading Co. and Miller Bros. that

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 347.
Id. at 346–47.
Id. at 357–58 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210–11 (1960).
Id. at 210.
Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 761–62 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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the collection duty and tax liability are identical for the purpose
of the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.58
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, a Michigan motor
carrier insisted that the Mississippi sales tax conflicted with the
dormant Commerce Clause.59 The tax was equal to five percent of
the gross income of a transportation business in Mississippi. 60
The motor carrier claimed that the tax imposed a burden on the
privilege of engaging in business in the state, and that its activity
being interstate commerce, violated the holding in Spector.61 The
Court, however, simply overruled Spector in favor of the following
four-pronged test:62
These decisions have considered not the formal language of the tax
statute but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax
against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
is fairly related to the service provided by the State.63

This test undoubtedly rationalized the approach to constitutionalize a
state tax under the dormant Commerce Clause. In fact, according to
experts of constitutional law, the Court has since then “consistently
followed” this test.64 One of the remaining questions is how Bellas
Hess would be analyzed under this test given that Bellas Hess did
not precisely distinguish the Due Process Clause and the dormant
Commerce Clause. Moreover, Bellas Hess was concerned not with tax
liability itself, but with the collection duty.65
In Quill, the Court revisited the same question as Bellas
Hess—whether a state may impose a duty to collect use tax upon
a retailer that does not have a physical presence in the state.66
The Court’s opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens, first declared
that “[t]he two constitutional requirements,” the Due Process
Clause on the one hand and the dormant Commerce Clause on
the other, “differ fundamentally.”67 For the first time, the Court

58 See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954).
59 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274–76 (1977).
60 Id. at 275.
61 Id. at 278.
62 Id. at 287–89.
63 Id. at 279 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 277–78, 287 (rationalizing the
four-pronged test).
64 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 480 (5th
ed., 2015); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992).
65 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
66 Quill, 504 U.S. at 301–02.
67 Id. at 305.
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followed the distinction proposed by Justice Rutledge. 68 With
regard to the Due Process Clause, by consulting the cases on
judicial jurisdiction, the Court removed the element of physical
presence in determining the link that justifies exercise of taxing
power.69 In other words, it overruled Miller Bros., Scripto, and
Bellas Hess in this regard.70 It concluded the collection duty in
question did not conflict with the Due Process Clause.71
On the subject of the dormant Commerce Clause, Quill started
from an analysis of the historical development of the cases.72 Then,
it took the facts of Bellas Hess through the four-pronged test of
Complete Auto and concluded:
Bellas Hess concerns the first of these tests and stands for the
proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State
are by mail or common carrier lacks the “substantial nexus” required
by the Commerce Clause.73

The Court contended that Bellas Hess created a bright-line
rule, or a safe harbor, in the first prong of the four-pronged test,
which itself is a pragmatic standard.74 Presumably it is difficult,
if not impossible, to justify such a formalistic rule placed within a
pragmatic standard from a policy standpoint. Therefore, Justice
Stevens sought its foundation in “the doctrine and principles of
stare decisis . . . .”75
In sum, through the general framework of the four-pronged
test for state tax enunciated in Complete Auto,76 Quill placed the
case law on the collection duty in the first prong of Complete
Auto.77 However, whereas Complete Auto declined to follow the
formalist approach of Spector78 in favor of a more substantial one,
Quill kept a formalistic element in the first prong.79 Hence these
decisions contain an implied conflict in their differing approaches.
E. The Significance of Wayfair
The Court’s opinion in Wayfair, written by Justice Kennedy,
at last rejected the physical presence rule formulated by Bellas
68 Id. at 305–06 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353
(1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
69 Id. at 307–08.
70 Id. at 306–08.
71 Id. at 308.
72 Id. at 306–08.
73 Id. at 311.
74 Id. at 314–15.
75 Id. at 317.
76 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
77 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311–13.
78 See generally Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
79 Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
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Hess and Quill and overruled both cases.80 The Court presented five
reasons in rejecting the rule. The first three reasons concerned
Quill. 81 First, the Court found that “the physical presence rule
[was] not a necessary interpretation of” the first prong of the
Complete Auto test.82 It was “a poor proxy for the compliance costs
faced by companies that do business in multiple States.”83 Second,
the Court noted that the rule distorted competition and worked as a
tax shelter. 84 It disadvantaged local businesses and interstate
businesses with a physical presence in the state.85 Third, the rule
was at odds with the case-by-case approach of the Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.86 In addition, the Court pointed out
that the application of the physical presence rule would be all the
more inappropriate, given the advance of information technology in
recent years.87 Lastly, the Court claimed that the rule created unfair
and unjust consequences for all concerned actors.88
As previously mentioned, the extent of the taxing power of a
state is demarcated by two considerations: One is the limit of tax
jurisdiction itself, and the other is the effects of the exercise of
the taxing power.89 The issue in Wayfair was the former. If, as
Justice Rutledge had argued, the Due Process Clause exclusively
dealt with the question of tax jurisdiction and, in contrast, the
dormant Commerce Clause only with the question of the effects
of the tax, Quill and Wayfair would not have been dormant
Commerce Clause cases. In reality, Complete Auto kept the issue
of jurisdiction within the ambit of the dormant Commerce
Clause.90 Accordingly, Quill and Wayfair dealt with the collection
duty under the dormant Commerce Clause. 91 Nevertheless,
assuming that the issue should be dealt with under the dormant
Commerce Clause, Wayfair correctly ruled by opting for a
case-by-case analysis instead of a bright-line physical presence
rule.92 However, Wayfair did not pay any attention to the fact
that the tax liability in question was the collection duty of use

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
See id. at 2092.
Id.
Id. at 2093.
Id. at 2094.
Id. at 2094–95.
Id.
Id. at 2095.
Id. at 2095–96.
See supra Part I.A.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1977).
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992).
See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094.
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tax and that the economic burden of the tax itself was borne by
consumers in the state.93
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on collection duty of
state consumption tax at this moment might be summarized as
follows: The dormant Commerce Clause has strictly limited state’s
taxing power from both substantive and procedural aspects. In
recent years, the substantive aspect has rarely been disputed in the
context of state consumption taxes. But the second, third, and
fourth prongs of the Complete Auto test will be applied to the cases
on taxes. 94 Procedurally, an exercise of taxing power out of the
jurisdiction is prohibited. The first prong of the Complete Auto test
exactly examines this aspect.95 Wayfair fine-tuned this examination
by weighing physical elements to a lesser extent.96
II. TAX COMPETITION AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN JAPAN
A. Outline of the Tax System in Japan
1. Local Governments in Japan
Before referring to the tax system of Japan, this Article
explains the basic structures of Japanese local governments.
Japan is not a federal state—sovereignty is exclusively reserved
for the national government. Japan’s Constitution simply
requires that a local system be constituted under the principle of
local autonomy. 97 It says little about organization of local
governments. 98 The Local Autonomy Act of 1947 99 adopts a
two-tiered local government structure: forty-seven prefectures
and approximately 1700 municipalities. 100 The municipalities
cover all of Japan’s territories.101 This structure means Japan does
not have unincorporated areas.102 Even though prefectures do not
have authority to control municipalities, all the municipalities
belong to one of the prefectures. 103 In other words, every person
living in Japan belongs to one of the municipalities and one of the
prefectures. With regard to the function performed by the
See id. at 2088.
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 278.
Id.
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“Physical presence is not necessary to create a
substantial nexus.”).
97 NIHONKOKU KENP [KENP ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 92.
98 Id. at art. 93.
99 Chih jichi h [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947.
100 ATSURO SASASKI, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, JAPAN, LOCAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 3 (2014).
101 See id. at 5.
102 KURT STEINER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 169 (1965).
103 Chih jichi h [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 5, para. 2.
93
94
95
96
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governments, municipalities are far more important than
prefectures. Municipalities (or basic local governments as they
are sometimes called)104 play a major role in the everyday lives of
its citizens.105 Under Articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the Local Autonomy
Act of 1947, the national government delegates to municipalities
the power to regulate “local affairs” [chiiki ni okeru jimu] and
other specifically enumerated affairs.106 The role of prefectures in
administering local affairs is subsidiary. Article 2(5) of the Act
covers regional affairs, coordination of municipalities, and other
affairs not appropriate for municipalities to administer.107 Even
from these affairs, some are designated for delegation to midsized
or large municipalities located in the prefecture.108
Then, after World War II, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (“SCAP”) required delegation of a wide variety of
regulatory power to local governments. 109 As a result of major
reforms of local governance during the past quarter century,
municipalities acquired more power than before.110
2. Local Taxation in Japan111
The Constitution of Japan expresses nothing about the
country’s tax system. It just declares that the payment of taxes is
a duty of Japanese citizens112 and requires the Diet to implement
tax laws.113 The substance of the tax system is entirely left to the
Diet. With its broad authority, it chose a tax system that includes
personal income tax, corporate income tax, inheritance tax, and
value-added tax (“VAT”) as the source of revenue for the national
government.114 The VAT system is a European-type value-added
Id. at art. 2, para. 3.
T OKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, The Structure of the Metropolitan
Government, http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/ABOUT/STRUCTSTR/structure01.htm
[http://perma.cc/Z6BQ-HA9Z].
106 Id. at art. 2, paras. 2–3. The power to regulate “affairs” in Japanese local
government law is identical to the “police power” in the U.S. law. See KURT STEINER, supra
note 102, at 127–28.
107 See Chih jichi h [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 2, para. 5.
108 Chih jichi h [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 69 of 1946, art. 2, para. 4.
109 See Terry MacDougall, Towards Political Inclusiveness: The Changing Role of Local
Government in Japan, WORLD BANK INST. 1, 8 (2001), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/268371468260928014/pdf/330440wbi37169.pdf [http://perma.cc/X47M-BH3R].
110 See HIROSHI IKAWA, NAT’L GRADUATE INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, 15 YEARS OF
DECENTRALIZATION REFORM IN JAPAN 8–9, 12–26, 28 (2008), www.jlgc.org.uk/en/pdfs/upto-date_en4.pdf [http://perma.cc/S9PP-4N54].
111 For additional information on the tax system in Japan, see generally HIROMITSU
ISHI, THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM (3d. ed. 2001).
112 NIHONKOKU KENP KENP [KENP ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 30.
113 Id. at art. 84. For the reader’s reference, the Diet is the national legislature of Japan.
114 For background and additional commentary on the Japanese tax system, see
Tadao Okamura, The Japanese Tax System: Due Process and the Taxpayer, 11 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 125 (1993).
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tax system, in which not only retailers, but also wholesalers
cooperate in collecting the tax—unlike the American style sales
tax, in which taxes are collected only by retailers.115 Some portion
of the tax revenue from VAT is automatically sent to local
governments. 116 Local governments have personal income tax,
corporate business/income taxes, and property tax as their own
sources of revenue. 117 Local personal income tax and local
corporate income tax make use of the tax base of national
counterparts.118 Although they are not technically a surtax to the
national income taxes, they are essentially constituents of
national income taxes. Property tax is the only tax that is
reserved for local governments.
Up to this point, it appears that the tax jurisdiction is
properly distributed among national and local governments.
However, when the two levels of local governments—prefectures
and municipalities—are taken into account, the tax revenue for
the prefectures in rural areas tends to be insufficient as
compared to urban areas. First, the local corporate income tax,
which is the only major tax reserved exclusively for the
prefectures, is highly volatile.119 In addition, in part because the
tax is allocated according to the number of offices and employees,
the revenue from the taxes is concentrated in the metropolitan
prefectures, especially Tokyo prefecture.120
As explained in the previous section, local governments play
a crucial role in administrating local and other affairs. However,
the local tax revenue is far less than the necessary amount to
make ends meet. To make up for the deficit, the national
government allots “tax” to the local governments. In order to
mitigate interference with the decision-making of the local
governments, the total amount of the allotted tax is statutorily
determined.121 The amount of allotted tax for a local government
is calculated as follows: First, a standardized amount of expenditure
is estimated from the population, the area, and other objective data
of the local government. 122 Next, a standardized amount of tax
Id.
Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 72-114; id. at art. 72-115.
Id. at art. 4, para. 2 (prefectures); id. at art. 5, para. 2 (municipalities).
Id. at art. 32 (prefectural personal income tax); id. at art. 23, para. 1, no. 3
(prefectural corporate tax income); id. at art. 313 (municipal personal income tax); id. at
art. 292, para. 1, no. 3 (municipal corporate income tax).
119 See, e.g., EIJI TAJIKA & YUJI YUI, Fiscal Decentralization in Japan: Does it Harden
the Budgets of Local Governments? in TACKLING JAPAN’S FISCAL CHALLENGES: STRATEGIES
TO COPE WITH HIGH PUBLIC DEBT AND POPULATION AGING, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
126 (Keimi Kaizuka & Anne O. Krueger eds., 2006).
120 See infra note 129, at 28–30.
121 Chih k fuzei h [Local Allocation Tax Act], Law No. 211 of 1950, art. 6.
122 See id. at art. 10.
115
116
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revenue is estimated by taking three quarters of the estimated tax
revenue of the local government. The amount of allocation tax will
be the balance of the standardized amount expenditure and the
standardized amount of revenue.123 A 25% percent discount gives
local governments an incentive to increase their tax revenue as long
as the estimated tax revenue does not exceed about 133% of the
standardized amount of expenditure.124
3. Demarcation of Taxing Powers among Local Governments
There is no constitutional doctrine that delineates tax
jurisdictions of local governments in Japan. This is natural
because Japan’s Constitution empowers the Diet to design the
local government system. The national government delegates its
taxing power to local governments as articulated by the Local Tax
Act of 1950.125
Some insist that the Constitution guarantees local
governments their own original power to tax. Surprisingly, a
lower court decision in 1980 upheld the claim, although in
dictum, by stating “such a statute that totally or virtually denies
the taxing power of local governments is unconstitutional and
void.”126 However, such a claim is ridiculous, to say the least. In
the context of local governance, it is one thing to have a local
government, but quite another that the government finances its
resources only through its own tax revenue. Many countries,
including Japan, transfer revenue between national/federal and
local governments.127 And as the decision itself makes clear, the
claim does not put forward a meaningful standard to decide
whether a given level of fiscal independence of a local government
is sufficient to make it constitutional.
The Local Tax Act of 1950 does not contain any general
provisions to limit local governments’ exercise of taxing power.
Despite that, we rarely find disputes concerning tax competition
among local governments.128
The main reason is that the Act meticulously articulates the
tax base, tax rate, and other features of principal taxes. The local
governments have little room for exercising their power to tax
Chih k fuzei h [Local Allocation Tax Act], Law No. 211 of 1950, art. 10.
See id.
See Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 2.
126 Fukuoka Chih Saibansho [Fukuoka Dist. Ct.] June 5, 1980, Omuta-shi [City of
Omuta, Fukuoka] v. Kuni [The Government of Japan], 417 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 51, 60.
127 See, e.g., Hansjörg Blöchliger & Claire Charbit, Fiscal Equalisation, 2008 OECD
J.: ECON. STUD., 265, 277 (2008).
128 For additional information on the tax scheme of Japan, see generally
KENICHIRO H ARADA, COUNCIL OF L OCAL AUTHS. FOR INT’ L RELATIONS, LOCAL
T AXATION IN JAPAN (2009).
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freely. However, the Act does give local governments three kinds
of flexibility. 129 First, the Act authorizes local governments to
adopt higher tax rates that are different from the standard rate
for any of the taxes. 130 Most of the prefectures use this
“additional tax rate” [choka kazei] for prefectural per capita
personal taxation, prefectural corporate per capita taxation, and
prefectural corporate income taxation. Eight prefectures even use
it for prefectural corporate business taxation. Some of the
municipalities employ the additional tax rate for municipal
corporate per capita taxation and municipal corporate income
taxation. As of 2017, 153 out of 1719 municipalities apply
additional tax rate on their local property tax. Whereas the
standard rate for local property tax is 1.4 %, 141 municipalities
apply a higher rate of 1.5%. 131
Second, the Act authorizes municipalities to reduce or
increase tax liability for several enumerated properties. For
example, municipalities may impose tax against power plants for
renewable energy at a lower rate or a higher rate.132
Third, the Act gives local governments power to introduce
“extra-statutory” taxes. The legal issues regarding this concept
will be discussed below. For now, it is sufficient to understand
that the tax revenue from these taxes is relatively limited.133
B. Extra-Statutory Taxation on Nuclear Plants
1. Introduction
Extra-statutory taxes are local taxes that a local government
imposes without direct delegation from national legislation. They
consist of two types of taxes. One is called an extra-statutory
normal tax. 134 The other is an extra-statutory earmarked tax,
which was newly introduced in 2000.135 Most of the tax revenue
of extra-statutory normal taxes is from taxes on nuclear fuel or
other nuclear power related property.136 Most of the tax revenue
129 S mush jichi zeimu kyoku [MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMC’NS,
LOCAL PUB. FIN. BUREAU], Chihou zeisei kankei shiryo [MATERIALS ON LOCAL TAX
SYSTEM] 34 (2018).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 56.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 4, para. 2, art. 5, para. 3
(prefectures and municipalities).
135 Id. at art. 4, para. 6, art. 5, para. 7 (prefectures and municipalities).
136 HARADA, supra note 128, at 26. In the 2016 fiscal year, tax revenue from taxes
related to nuclear plants were 39.3 billion yen out of the total tax revenue of 51.7 billion
yen from extra-statutory normal taxes. MATERIALS ON LOCAL TAX SYSTEM, supra note
131, at 37.
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of extra-statutory earmarked taxes is from taxes on industrial
wastes.137 This section uses taxes on nuclear fuel as an example
in demonstrating certain defects of the Japanese local tax system.
The origin of extra-statutory taxes lies in the practices in
place in the pre-World War II era. Under the Ruling on Local Tax
of 1880138 and the Act on Local Tax of 1926,139 there were many
kinds of taxes imposed by local governments. At that time, the
national statutes allowed prefectures to impose original taxes
[zasshu zei]. However, these taxes greatly hindered smooth
commerce between localities. The Local Tax Act of 1940 140
conditioned municipalities’ introduction of an independent tax
[dokuritsu zei] other than those enumerated in the Act, on the
permission of the Minister of Internal Affairs141 and the Minister
of Finance. The Act abolished the original taxes and prohibited
prefectures from imposing unenumerated independent taxes. After
World War II, revisions to the Act in 1946 granted prefectures
authority to impose unenumerated independent taxes. 142 The
present Act, the Local Tax Act of 1950, renamed them
extra-statutory taxes and allowed all local governments to adopt
one under the permission [kyoka] of the Minister of Home
Affairs. 143 The Act stipulated five conditions for the
permission: actual existence of the source of revenue in the
jurisdiction; demand for revenue sufficient to justify the proposed
tax; the tax base is not the same as national taxes or other local
taxes and imposition of the tax does not excessively burden the
residents; the taxation does not greatly impede the commerce
between the local governments; and the taxation must be
appropriate from the perspective of the national government’s
economic policy.144
In 2000, as a part of a major reform of the local government
system, the Diet gave local governments more discretion in
levying extra-statutory taxes.145 The revision of the Act in 2000
137 HARADA, supra note 128, at 26. In the 2016 fiscal year, tax revenue from taxes
related to industrial wastes were 6.6 billion yen out of the total tax revenue of 10.1 billion
yen from extra-statutory earmarked taxes. MATERIALS ON LOCAL TAX SYSTEM, supra note
131, at 37.
138 Chih zei kisoku [Rulings on Local Tax], Decree of the Cabinet No. 16 of 1880.
139 Chih zei ni kansuru h ritsu [Act on Local Tax], Law No. 24 of 1926.
140 Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 60 of 1940.
141 The Ministry of Internal Affairs was later reorganized as the Ministry of Home
Affairs and then the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. See NOBUKI
MOCHIDA, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPAN 10 (2008).
142 The Local Tax Act of 1948 also authorized local governments to impose
unenumerated independent taxes. See Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 110 of 1948,
art. 46, para. 2, and art. 103, paras. 2 and 3.
143 See generally Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950.
144 Id.
145 See HARADA, supra note 128, at 25.
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replaced the permission by the Minister with his “consent”
[d i] to the proposal of a new tax. 146 And the Act required the
Minister to consent to the proposal when the statutory conditions
are met. The Act also dropped the first two conditions in the
previous statute.147 The 2004 revision of the Act imposed upon the
local government a duty to ask for opinions of the taxpayers in
proposing a new extra-statutory tax when the number of potential
taxpayers is small and therefore only these taxpayers are supposed
to bear heavy burden of the tax.148
2. The Advent of the Nuclear Fuel Taxes
The first local government that introduced nuclear fuel tax was
the Fukui prefecture. The prefecture has had several nuclear
reactors in the territory since 1970.149 In the new year’s greeting of
1972, Heiday Nakagawa, then the Governor of the prefecture,
revealed his plan to launch a new extra-statutory tax on nuclear
power plants.150 His proposal was to reduce the profits of power
companies and to transfer the amount reduced to the prefecture in
which power plants were located. 151 Soon thereafter, then
Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, submitted an idea of new
national tax on power plants. His idea became a tax for
promotion of power-resources development.152 The tax encourages
local governments to accept power plants, including nuclear power
plants.153 The tax base of this tax is wholesale electric energy. The
tax revenue from the tax is allocated to local governments as a
subsidy.154 However, like any other subsidy, the allocated funds are
earmarked for limited power plant-related purposes. In light of such
inconveniences inherent in the national tax and the accompanying
subsidy, some local governments still wished for tax revenue from
See id.
See id.
Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 259, para. 2; art. 669, para.
2; art. 731, para. 3.
149 For background information of the reactors, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Nuclear
Reactors in Japan: Who Asks for Them, What Do They Do? (Harvard Law Sch. John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econs., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 909, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986410.
150 Hatsuden zei shinsetsu wo junbi [Preparing for Electricity Tax], YOMIURI-SHIMBUN,
Jan. 5, 1972, at 2.
151 Id.
152 Dengen kaihatsu sokushin zei ho [Act on Tax for Promotion of Power-Resources
Development], Law No. 79 of 1974.
153 Needless to say, the tax is one of the incentives the Japanese national government
offers to local governments. For the analysis of these incentives, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Why
Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan, 13
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 457, 459, 479, 481 (2012), which points out that people rationally
built nuclear power plants on fault lines.
154 See Hiroshi Onitsuka, Hooked on Nuclear Power: Japanese State-Local Relations
and the Vicious Cycle of Nuclear Dependence, 10 ASIA-PAC. J. 1, 7 (2012).
146
147
148
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an extra-statutory tax. Because the tax base of an extra-statutory
tax must not “be the same as existing national taxes or other
local taxes,” taxing electric energy, which is already the object of
the tax for promotion of power-resources development, does not
seem to pass muster. 155 Nevertheless, in 1976, the Minister of
Home Affairs permitted the proposal of nuclear fuel tax by Fukui
prefecture.156 The prefecture played a little trick here. It chose as
the object of the tax the supply of nuclear fuel into the reactor.157
The tax base is the price of the fuel. It thus avoided conflict
with the statutory condition. It is unclear what sort of political
negotiations occurred, however, it is reasonable to infer that
the permission by the Minister originated not from mere
interpretation of the Local Tax Act, but rather from some highly
political considerations.
Having permitted the new tax of Fukui prefecture, the
Minister was forced to permit other prefectures to impose
identical or similar taxes: Fukushima (1977), Ibaraki (1978),
Ehime (1979), Saga (1979), Shimane (1980), Shizuoka (1980),
Kagoshima (1983), Miyagi (1983), Niigata (1984), Hokkaido
(1988), Ishikawa (1992), and Aomori (2004) followed Fukui in
imposing an extra-statutory tax on nuclear fuel.158 All these taxes
were valid for a limited time and have been subsequently
renewed several times.159
3. The 2011 Fukushima Disaster and Its Effects on Nuclear
Fuel Taxes
On March 11, 2011, a tsunami caused by a powerful earthquake
hit the coasts of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures. 160
Consequently, the nuclear reactors’ cores at the Fukushima Daiichi
[Number One] power plant began to melt.161 The power plant was
closed, and the operations of all the other nuclear power plants were
temporarily suspended. This essentially meant that the object of

See THE ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 22, 1976, at 3.
Fukui ken kakunenryo zei jorei [Ordinance on the Nuclear Fuel Tax of Fukui
Prefecture], Ordinance (Fukui Prefecture) No. 40 of 1976.
157 See Norihiko Kuwabara & Takufumi Yoshida, Prefectures taxing nuclear plants until
the bitter end, T HE ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 22, 2018), http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/
AJ201806220038.html [http://perma.cc/N3SU-CPXJ].
158 GREEN TAXATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 219 (Larry Kreiser et al.
eds., 2012).
159 See id.
160 Kenneth Pletcher & John P. Rafferty, Japan Earthquake and Tsumani of 2011,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/
event/Japan-earthquake-and-tsunami-of-2011 [http://perma.cc/NUT9-47K2].
161 See Fukushima Daiichi Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (last updated Oct. 2018),
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/
fukushima-accident.aspx [http://perma.cc/8JCT-E5WG].
155
156
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nuclear fuel taxes did not exist anymore. The prefectures suddenly
lost all tax revenue.162
This incident changed the prefectures’ policy on nuclear fuel
taxes. As one consequence, Fukushima prefecture did not renew
its ordinance on nuclear fuel tax and the ordinance lost its effect
at the end of 2012.163
Further, other prefectures, having been dependent on the
revenue from nuclear fuel taxes for a long time, sought means to
collect money even when the reactors were shut down. 164 They
revised the ordinances and began to impose a tax on the “business
regarding operation and decommissioning of nuclear reactors.” 165
Technically speaking, they modified the ordinances to make part of
the tax base calculated on the thermal power [netsu shutsuryoku] of
the reactors. Take Hokkaido (a prefecture) as an example, which
has imposed this tax on Hokkaido Electric Power Company since
September 2013. 166 The tax base is 5960 MW, the sum of the
thermal power of the three reactors located in Tomari Power Plant,
which is the only nuclear power plant in Hokkaido.167 The tax rate
is 37,750 yen per MW for three months.168 Hence the annual tax
revenue is 900 million yen.
Some prefectures began to impose other kinds of taxes on
nuclear power plants. Three prefectures, Fukui, Ibaraki, and
Aomori, levy taxes on power companies or reprocessing businesses
for their imports and storage of spent nuclear fuel. The Aomori
prefecture is the most conspicuous in this regard. The tax revenue
from the tax on the handling of nuclear fuel materials [kakunenryo
busshitsu to toriatukai zei] was a little less than 20 billion yen in
2016.169 It reached nearly twenty percent of the 115 billion yen of

Kuwabara & Yoshida, supra note 157.
Yuhei Sato, the Governor of Fukushima prefecture, emphasized that the tax policy is
consistent with the prefecture’s demand for nuclear decommissioning. See Fukushima to Ax
Nuclear Fuel Tax, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 21, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/21/
national/fukushima-to-ax-nuclear-fuel-tax/#.W7GYgy-ZM6W [http://perma.cc/4REG-VP45].
164 Kuwabara & Yoshida, supra note 157.
165 See Fukui ken kakunenryo zei jorei [Ordinance on the Nuclear Fuel Tax of Fukui
Prefecture], Ordinance (Fukui Prefecture) No. 30 of 2016, art. 5, no. 2 (referring to both
operation and decommissioning). Cf. Hokkaido kakunenryo zei jorei [Ordinance on the
Nuclear Fuel Tax of Hokkaido], Ordinance (Hokkaido) No. 8 of 2013, art. 4 (referring only
to operation of nuclear reactors).
166 Kyodo, Hokkaido Electric to Execute Second Price Hike, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/10/business/hokkaido-electric-execute-secondprice-hike-november/#.XBsLfS2ZPOQ [http://perma.cc/FK3P-PE3A].
167 See HOKKAIDO ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC., http://www.hepco.co.jp/energy/atomic/
data/specification.html [http://perma.cc/L2K3-FK5Z].
168 See NUCLEAR FUEL TAX (last updated Aug. 28, 2018), http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/
sm/zim/tax/atom01.htm [http://perma.cc/5U8V-DKPQ].
169 Id.
162
163
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the prefecture’s tax revenue, excluding the amount of allocated
consumption tax.170
4. A Critical Appraisal of the Control on Extra-Statutory
Taxes
a. The Nuclear Fuel Taxes and the Political Process
The nuclear fuel taxes are a mechanism used to incentivize
local governments to accept nuclear power plants. Mark Ramseyer
persuasively described the dynamics in which poor villages
rationally, but shortsightedly, ask for subsidies at the cost of being
the permanent location for nuclear power plants, which eventually
render them unable to break from the resulting vicious cycle. 171
Admittedly, in analyzing nuclear fuel taxes thoroughly, the political
process should be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting the defects of the Local Tax Act, particularly how its
standards limit the taxing power of local governments. Even if
certain transfers of wealth from a party to another should be
considered desirable in the political process, it would not be
achieved as the form of local tax had the national legislation strictly
dismissed the alternative.
b. A Comparison with the Dormant Commerce Clause in
the United States
This section identifies the problem with nuclear fuel taxes
from the legal perspective. Next, this section examines which part
of the Local Tax Act has given rise to such problems by comparing
the statute with dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the
United States.
There are several problems with nuclear fuel taxes. The first is
that their essential qualities are far from apparent. Particularly, it
is not clear who the legislators intended to have bear the burden of
the taxes. The power companies, or their shareholders, may be the
tax bearers. Or it may also be the consumers of the electricity.
However, because the taxes are considered to be the costs calculated
in the electricity rates, it would be reasonable to assume that the
consumers bear the tax burden.172
Second, since the consumers bear the tax burden, those who
are subject to the taxes were never involved in determining the
tax legislation. Nor do the consumers have any means to dispute
170 Financial Situation, AOMORI PREFECTURAL GOV’T. (last updated Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.pref.aomori.lg.jp/soshiki/soumu/zeimu/files/H28_kenzei.pdf [http://perma.cc/3VAT-4BFX].
171 Ramseyer, supra note 153.
172 See Kuwabara & Yoshida, supra note 157.

110

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 22:1

the legality of the taxes against either the Local Tax Act or other
national legislation.
Third, there is a problem with the recent modification of the
taxes. All prefectures, other than Fukushima, revised their
ordinances and began to impose taxes on the power companies,
even when those companies do not operate nuclear reactors.173
Because the reactors generate no electricity, such a tax cannot be
a consumption tax (the economic burden of which would be borne
by the consumers of electricity). However, neither the prefectures
nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications give
any reasoned explanation for this. In any case, it would be quite
unreasonable to impose a fixed consumption tax irrespective of
the level of consumption. The modification of the taxes has
revealed that they are no more than simply a means to obtain a
subsidy, as long as the nuclear power plants are located in their
territories and there is no sensible justification for the taxes.
It is easy to see these problems stem from the absence of a
Japanese equivalent to the dormant Commerce Clause. If Japan
had a dormant Commerce Clause, it would have been possible to
examine the validity of the nuclear fuel taxes using a test similar
to the Complete Auto test. 174 For instance, the tax might be
invalidated because it is not fairly related to the services the
prefecture provides.175 The tax on imports of spent nuclear fuel
might conflict with the prohibition of discrimination against
out-of-state actors.176 In fact, as previously noted, the Local Tax
Act needs only three requirements for the consent of the Minister
of Internal Affairs and Communications.177 These requirements
do not allow for the invalidation of a tax that would harm the
local tax system or domestic commerce.
Furthermore, there are at least two other serious defects in
the Act. First, it is not clear when taxation against consumers
outside the territory of the local governments is allowed, if at all.
The Act provides that the source of income and location of the
property must be within the territory before imposing taxes on
income or property. 178 However, it does not spell out what
principle governs the consumption taxes. Second, the Act says
nothing about indirect taxes. The duty to ask for opinions of
taxpayers, introduced by the revision of the Act in 2004, has

173
174
175
176
177
178

See id.
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
See id.
See id.
See HARADA, supra note 128, at 25.
Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 262, 672, & 733-2.
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nothing to do with the indirect taxes because the economic burden
of them would be borne by people different from the taxpayers.
Let us go back to Wayfair now. In the cases on the collection
duty of state use tax in the United States, the consumers within the
state are the ones who bear the economic burden of the use tax.179
The issue is whether the retailer that seems to have a scarce
connection with the state is nevertheless obligated to collect tax
from those consumers. In contrast, the nuclear fuel taxes in Japan
are imposed on the power companies that have power plants in the
territory of the local government. However, the tax burden is shifted
to the consumers out of the territory. Both countries struggle in
dealing with indirect consumption taxes. In the United States, by
taking only the taxpayer into account, the fair apportionment of tax
burden among the consumers in the state has failed, although
Wayfair has mitigated the problem.180 In Japan, by disregarding the
consumers who bear the tax, the nuclear fuel taxes were
implemented as an indirect vehicle for tax collection.
C. The “Hometown Tax Donation” System
1. Introduction
During the past decade, taxpayers’ attitudes towards Japanese
local income taxation have drastically changed. The change was
prompted by a newly-introduced tax credit regarding donations.
Since the tax credit’s introduction in 2008, competition for donations
among municipalities and prefectures has gradually accelerated
through their offers of goods and services in return for donations.181
This section will examine how the tax credit, and resulting
behaviors of both local governments and taxpayers, can be seen as
another example of how the local tax system in Japan is defective.
In Japan, local governments and the national government
impose income taxes on their residents. Whereas there are many
statutory provisions for the national income tax182 and a large
number of officials managing the national tax system, there are
very few statutory provisions for local income taxes, with only a
small number of officials hired to implement them. The reason
for this is that local governments are largely dependent on the

See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992).
See generally South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
See Tomohiro Osaki, Hometown ‘tax’ donations system catching on, JAPAN TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/20/reference/hometown-taxdonations-system-catching/#.W9jKBXpKiu4 [http://perma.cc/S5RT-CRFX].
182 See Shotoku zei h [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965.
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computation of income generated by the national income tax.183
By referring to the tax base of the national income tax for the
previous year, the local income taxes barely require their own
computation process.
In spite of almost the same computation process, officials
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications have
forcefully insisted over time that the nature of the local income
taxes is different from that of the national income tax.184 They
assert that the local income taxes represent the principle of fair
share [futan bun-nin], one of the most important ideas in local
taxation.185 According to them, although this principle guides the
entire local tax system, it is especially prominent for local income
taxes because it justifies local governments’ taxation against
low-income people who are exempt from national income. The
principle has also been referred to in justifying the fact that
deductions and credits for various policy purposes are strictly
limited in the local income taxes.
The local governments impose two kinds of “inhabitant taxes”
[jumin zei] on individuals. One is per capita tax [kinto wari] on
residents and nonresidents that have local establishments, such as
land and buildings in the territory.186 However, the amount and the
significance of the per capita taxes is very small today. The other
inhabitant tax is the local income taxes [shotoku wari] on the
residents. These taxes are important in terms of their tax
revenue. 187 They consist of the prefectural income tax and the
municipal income tax.188 The tax base for these taxes is almost
the same as that for the national income tax. The standard tax
rate189 is four percent for the prefectural income tax190 and six
percent for the municipal income tax.191
183 Chih zei h [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 32 (prefectural personal
income tax); id. at art. 23, para. 1, no. 3 (prefectural corporate income tax); id. at art.
313 (municipal personal income tax); id. at art. 292, para. 1, no. 3 (municipal corporate
income tax).
184 See generally Takeo Yamauchi, “Kojin jumin zei no seikaku” ni kansuru ichi
kousatsu: “futan bun-nin” no imisuru mono (1) [A Consideration on the “Nature of
Inhabitant Taxes”: What “Fair Share” Means, Part I], 71 JICHI KENKYU 77, 80–85, 87–91
(1995) (showing an overview of the discourse on the principles of local taxation including
the principle of “fair share”).
185 See TAX BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FIN., AN OUTLINE OF JAPANESE TAXES: 2001-2002,
16 (2002).
186 The per capita taxes are also imposed on corporations and other entities that have
establishments or dormitories in the territory of the local government. See Local Tax Act,
Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 23, para. 1, no. 1; art. 24, para. 1, no. 1 & 2; art. 292, para. 1,
no. 1; art. 294, para. 1, no. 1 & 2.
187 See AN OUTLINE OF JAPANESE TAXES: 2001-2002, supra note 185, at 18.
188 See id.
189 The “standard tax rate” is the tax rate local governments apply under ordinary
circumstances. However, the Act does not admit local governments to apply different
rates for the local individual income taxes.
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2. Transformation of the Local Income Taxes in the Past
Decade
a. An Introduction of Tax Credits for the Donation to
Other Local Public Bodies
The 2008 revision to the Local Tax Act192 drastically changed
tax rules for donations, especially for donations to prefectures
and municipalities other than the one in which the taxpayer’s
residence is located. The “hometown tax donation [furusato
nozei]” system,193 introduced by the revision, in essence expanded
tax benefits for the taxpayers who made donations to local
governments.194 Before the revision, the amount of donation to
local governments exceeding 5000 yen was deducted from income
for the purpose of calculating the national income tax. 195
Deduction from the local income taxes was allowed only if the
amount of donation exceeds 100,000 yen. The tax revision newly
allowed a tax credit against local income tax liability for ten
percent of the amount of donation if it exceeds 5000 yen. Given
the fact that the aggregate tax rate of the local income taxes is
ten percent, this tax credit means that the rate of local income
taxes is zero for the amount of donations. Therefore, it is the
same as a deduction of the amount of donations from taxable
income. Furthermore, the revision offers another benefit to those
who make donations to municipalities and prefectures. A new tax
credit not exceeding one-tenth of the taxpayer’s local income tax
liability is granted for the amount of the donation.196 Combined
with the previously mentioned income deduction and tax credit,
this “special” tax credit allowed a taxpayer who pays a fee of 5000
yen to transfer the amount equivalent to ten percent of his local
income tax liability to whichever municipalities or prefectures he
Local Tax Act, Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 35, para. 1.
Id. at art. 314-3, para. 1.
Local Tax Act, Law No. 21 of 2008. See Tomoyuki Saisu, Chihozeiho to no kaisei [The
Revisions on the Local Tax Act], Heisei 20 nen zeisei kaisei no kaisetsu [EXPLANATIONS ON
THE 2008 TAX REVISION], 647–49 (2008).
193 Technically speaking, the Japanese phrase “furusato nozei” connotes that the taxpayers
“pay tax” to municipalities and prefectures and not that they “donate” money to these. However,
we adopt here “hometown tax donation” as the translation of “furusato nozei” because it seems to
be the official translation. See, e.g., The Furusato Nozei Program: Tax Breaks with Benefits,
TOKYO WEEKENDER (Mar. 20, 2016), https://www.tokyoweekender.com/2016/03/the-furusatonozei-program-tax-breaks-with-benefits/ [http://perma.cc/UYW9-PW3R].
194 For articles on the hometown tax donation system written in English, see Anthony
Rausch, A Paradox of Japanese Taxation: Analyzing the Furusato Nozei Tax System, 15
ASIA-PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 1, 1 (2017) and Janet W. Kanzawa, Lobsters, Hot Air Balloons,
and the Hometown Tax: A Japanese Model for Revitalizing Rural Economies in the United
States, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1100, 1100 (2017).
195 Income Tax Act, Law No. 33 of 1965, art. 78. The 2006 tax revision had reduced
the minimum amount from 10,000 yen to 5000 yen. Id.
196 Local Tax Act, Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 37-2, para. 2, and art. 314-7, para. 2.
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or she chooses. In essence, by paying 5000 yen, a taxpayer
obtains the right to make his donation to local governments a
substitute for his tax payment.197
The report prepared by the committee of experts on local
governance offers two justifications for the hometown tax
donation system.198 One is that a taxpayer should be allowed to
pay tax to his own hometown municipality or prefecture from
which he has benefited in his or her younger years. In other
words, the donation is a deferred payment of consideration for
past public services. The other is that the system acts as an
incentive for municipalities and prefectures to compete to provide
better public services, not only to their own residents, but also to
other citizens as a whole. This explanation expects that the
amount of donations a local government assembles would stand
for the popularity of the policies it chooses. In other words, it
hopes for a taxpayer—instead of a consumer-voter in the Tiebout
model—to pick a local government which best satisfies his or her
preference pattern for public goods.199
A disparity of tax revenue among municipalities and
prefectures is in the background of the hometown tax donation
system.200 Local governments in the urban and industrial area
such as the Tokyo prefecture and the city of Nagoya have a large
amount of tax revenue from the local income tax, especially the
local corporate income tax.201 Conversely, those in rural areas have
difficulty making ends meet and are heavily dependent upon “local
allocation tax [chiho kofu zei]” from the central government.202
Accordingly, amelioration of the imbalance was one of the main
motives for the idea of hometown tax donation. However, it
entirely fails to accomplish this purpose. There is no assurance
that the taxpayers will act optimally in order to transfer the tax

197 For a discussion of this system, see Hometown tax donation system, JAPAN
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/11/editorials/reviewof-the/#.XB159C2ZPOQ [http://perma.cc/2KJ9-XDH7].
198 For an analysis, see Hideaki Sato, “Furusato nozei kenkyukai hokokusho” to
Furusato nozei seido [“The Report of the Committee on Hometown Tax Donation” and the
System of Hometown Tax Donation], 1366 JURISUTO 157 (2008) (containing the explanations
of a member of the committee for the report).
199 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 417–18 (1956) (proposing a model in which a consumer in a given municipality,
instead of voting to change the policy of the community, physically moves to another
municipality for policy that best satisfies his preference for public goods).
200 Takuji Koike, Chiho zaisei kaikaku to zeishu no chiiki-kan kakusa [The Reform of
Local Public Finance and the Disparity of Tax Revenue Among Localities], 593 CH SA TO
JOH 1 (2007).
201 See James Mayger & Hannah Dormido, The Rich are Getting Richer in Abe’s Japan,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-japan-inequality/.
202 See JURO TERANISHI, EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN JAPAN 46, 207 (2005).
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revenue from the rich local governments to the poor local
governments at the appropriate level.
For the purpose of the calculation of local allocation tax, the
amount of a donation is deducted from the tax revenue of the
residence municipalities/prefectures, but is not added to the tax
revenue of the receiving municipalities/prefectures. 203 The rule
means that the reduction of tax revenue for a local government
caused by the resident’s donation to other local governments is
considerably supplemented by an increase in the amount of local
allocation tax.204
b. The Emergence of “Governmental” Tax Shelters
through Rewards to the Donation
Even though many might have considered the idea of
hometown tax donation attractive, only a small number of
taxpayers dared to disburse 5000 yen to donate to other local
governments. Most taxpayers’ indifference was reasonable. They
had no motive at all to make donations to local governments when
they do not enjoy the benefit from the donation in a tangible form.
It is worth noting that, after the earthquake and tsunami of 2011,
some funds were sent through the system of hometown tax
donation to the local governments that were affected. 205 This
incident, however, did not accelerate the use of the system at a
significant degree. As a result, the legislators then dropped the
cost for the taxpayers from 5000 yen to 2000 yen in 2012. 206
However, the effect of this revision was also limited.
Then, several municipalities started to “reward” the donation,
which gradually changed the state of affairs. Since 2012, with the
help of web portals created by enterprises such as Trustbank
(furusato choice), Rakuten (Rakuten furusato nozei), i-mobile
(furunavi), Satofull, a subsidiary of Softbank (Satofull), JTB
(furupo), All Nippon Airways (ANA no furusato nozei), etc., the
amount of hometown tax donation saw an upsurge.207
The fair market value of the reward to the donation seems to
be about half of the amount of donation on average, though it

Saisu, supra note 192, at 649.
See Masakatsu Misumi, Jiko futan naki “kifu” no arikata ga towareru “furusato
nozei” [Hometown Tax Donation: A Questionable “Donation” without Real Burden], 371
RIPP TO CH SA 59, 70 (2015) (explaining in figure 14 the economic burden of actors with
respect to hometown tax donation).
205 See Osaki, supra note 181.
206 See Hometown tax donation system, supra note 197.
207 The names of the services they provide are indicated in the parentheses.
203
204
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depends on the policy of each local government.208 For example,
according to the Satofull website, the market value of the reward
given by Ureshino city in the Saga prefecture is almost fifty
percent of the amount of donation: A bottle of sake brewed in the
city under the brand of “Azumacho,” the market price of which is
5400 yen including VAT at eight percent, is on the list to choose
from for those who have made 10,000 yen of donation. 209
Similarly, a set of six plates of porcelain and a dice made of
porcelain manufactured in a pottery in the city, the market price
of which is 10,800 yen including VAT, is on the list for those who
have contributed 20,000 yen as hometown tax donation.210
The upsurge of the amount of donations in 2014 prompted
those municipalities and prefectures that have been reluctant to
introduce rewards for the hometown tax donation to join the
competition for donation. If a local government restrained itself
from offering rewards, it would continue to lose tax revenue from
its residents’ donation to other local governments. The 2014 tax
revision spurred the race by raising the maximum amount of the
“special” tax credit from ten percent of his local income tax
liability to twenty percent.211 It also simplified the procedure for
making the hometown tax donation by exempting most taxpayers
from the duty of filing their tax returns, who previously had to
file them only for the purpose of the donation.
As previously explained, the original intent of the hometown
tax donation system was just to allow taxpayers to choose local
governments to which they pay their local income taxes and, by
doing so, to alleviate the disproportionate financing ability among
the local governments to a certain degree. However, emergence of
the practice of rewards and accompanying popularity of the system
208 For an analysis of the state of affairs in 2018, see Taro Hagami, Furusato nozei
sontoku kanjo wasuto besuto 50 [Profit and Loss from the Hometown Tax Donation: The
Top 50 and the Bottom 50 Municipalities], 1614 CH
K RON 154 (2018).
209 Saga ken Ureshino shi [Ureshino City, Saga], Junmai daiginjo homon azumacho 1.8L,
SATOFULL, https://www.satofull.jp/products/detail.php?product_id=1000943
[http://perma.cc/A4MM-Q4FB] (offering a sake bottle of “Junmai daiginjo homon azumacho” as
the reward for a 10,000 yen donation). Cf. Homon azumacho junmai daiginjo 1.8L, SAITO
SHOTEN, http://www.saito-sake.com/shopdetail/005002000001/ [http://perma.cc/PS7L-XVR4]
(selling the same sake bottle at a liquor shop for 5400 yen via the internet).
210 Saga ken Ureshino shi [Ureshino City, Saga], Hizen yoshida yaki ji no
sakazuki yojo han shuki setto, S ATOFULL , https://www.satofull.jp/products/
detail.php?product_id=1013293 [http://perma.cc/CF6Y-6U8Y] (offering a set of six plates of
porcelain and a dice made of porcelain as the reward for a 20,000 yen donation).
Cf. Tsujiyo seitojo yojo han shuki, JI NO SAKAZUKI, https://jinosakazuki.thebase.in/items/3290714
[http://perma.cc/AT5Q-J2GJ] (selling the same porcelain and dice set at a local pottery shop for
10,800 yen via the internet).
211 See Takuya Shimomura, Chihozeiho to no kaisei [The Revisions on The Local
Tax Act], Heisei 27 nen zeisei kaisei no kaisetsu [Explanations on the 2015 Tax
Revision], 932–36 (2015).
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gave the system an unexpected role. It has turned into means to
vitalize local economy. To reward donors, local governments now
have to purchase their local goods and services from businesses in
their territories. And it is natural for the legislators to reinforce this
excellent method of subsidizing local governments that try hard to
vitalize their local businesses.
3. A Critical Appraisal of the Policy
To evaluate the hometown donation system precisely, we have to
know who the system benefits and who bears its costs. While credible
data is not available, this section considers two possibilities.
At one extreme, the taxpayer who makes a donation might
not change his or her consumption patterns at all. He or she may
just reduce purchase of consumption goods and acquire them as
the rewards for the donation. In this case, the tax donation
system works as an offer of tax reduction. The system is nothing
but a tax shelter benefiting the taxpayer.212 In this setting, all
the benefit from the system is absorbed by the taxpayer and the
local government. The system will not be beneficial to local
businesses to any extent because, as the sales of the goods to the
local government increase through the reward to the donation,
the sales to the consumers will decrease.
However, it is unrealistic to suppose the taxpayers will not
change their consumption patterns at all. Presumably, the taxpayers
will change the goods or services they consume. Therefore, at the
other extreme, they might keep their previous consumption patterns
and acquire additional goods and services through the donation tax
system. To the extent they increase consumption, the system might
be justified as a tool for stimulating the domestic economy.
Yet as far as the newly acquired goods and services through
the hometown tax system replace the previously consumed goods
and services, the system together with the rewards might distort
the market economy. If the goods and services the taxpayers
have formerly consumed have been produced in one municipality,
then the system merely substitutes them with those produced in
the other municipality at the expense of the national treasury.
Obviously, encouraging such a zero-sum game is not a reasonable
policy. If the goods and services have been imported from abroad,
then the system is nothing more than subsidies to the domestic
212 An opportunity of investment for taxpayers the expected return of which is positive
after tax, which is normally contrived and sold by financial institutions, is known as a “tax
shelter.” A donation to local public bodies under the hometown tax donation system is nothing
but a tax shelter, even though the local governments instead of financial institutions offer the
chance for it.
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industries. In sum, the hometown tax donation system possibly
harms the domestic and international commerce as a whole, even
if it effectively energizes the economy in some local governments
of Japan. It benefits local businesses at the sacrifice of the
businesses out of the territory.
If Japan had a dormant Commerce Clause, the rewards for the
donation would be invalidated because they unquestionably disturb
the domestic commerce. The Clause would invalidate them because
the burdens on the domestic commerce outweigh the overall
benefits of the policy. In addition, although it might be difficult to
argue that the rewards discriminate out-of-staters, they directly
harm other local governments. In reality, none of the articles in the
Local Tax Act effectively stop the rewards. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications just asks local governments to act
according to the principles of the hometown tax donation system.213
Only a part of local governments obey the guidance.
CONCLUSION
As the nuclear fuel taxes and the hometown tax donation
demonstrate, tax competition among local governments in Japan is
accelerating. This harms market economy by making it less efficient
and fails to redistribute wealth. The present circumstances in
Japan remind us of the essential function of the dormant Commerce
Clause. It plays an important role in implementing basic principles
of fiscal federalism. Even though Wayfair did not fully scrutinize
the nature of indirect tax and paid little attention to the character
of collection duty as it differs from ordinary tax liability, this
United States Supreme Court decision expanded the range of the
application of the legal doctrine and should be respected.

213 See, e.g., MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS, Furusato nozei ni
kakaru henreihin no sofu to ni tsuite [ON THE REWARDS FOR HOMETOWN TAX DONATION]
(2017); S mush jichi zeimu kyoku [MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMC’NS, LOCAL
PUB. FIN. BUREAU], supra note 131, at 130–32 (providing administrative guidance on the
rewards for hometown tax donation).

